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THE POLITICS OF THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN AFRICA:
IS GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP REALLY WORKING?

S

by Charles Mutasa*
INTRODUCTION

ome five years from the Millennium Declaration we are
faced with the inevitable need to reassess the current levels of poverty, the instruments that are in place for tackling poverty, and indeed the constraints that must be resolved.
The Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) represent an
unprecedented commitment by all nations and institutions,
including the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the
World Bank, to implement and realize the MDG targets that
need to be emphasized at all stages. The global ability to realize
the MDGs is partly dependent on the financing of such development. Aside from being affirmed as part of Goal Eight in the
MDGs, such understanding has also been reaffirmed in the 2002
Monterrey Consensus on enhancing financing for development.
MDGs are unique in that they represent the first global
compact among the heads of state of developed and developing

“Northern governments are guilty of
offering empty promises to the poor when
it comes to TRADE, AID, AND DEBT
RELIEF. While Least Developed Countries
face a complex of problems . . .efforts to
combat poverty have been systematically
undermined by Northern governments. On
trade, the industrialized countries have
operated a policy of highway robbery
masquerading as market access
preferences.”
– Kelvin Watkins, Oxfam International (2002)1
countries, the United Nations system, the World Bank, and the
IMF.2 The Goals have clear targets and achievable time-bound
indicators of success, which can galvanize support among citizens and governments alike. Throughout 2005, with ten years
remaining until the target year of 2015, civil society organizations, governments, and multilateral institutions will be focused
on meeting the Millennium Development Goals.
It is often said that global targets are easily set but seldom
met, and that for each success story there have been some setbacks. To many, the recent, September 2005 UN MDG+5
review, a summit that evaluated the progress towards the UN
Millennium Declaration, was much ado about nothing. Sadly,
issues of UN reform, peace and collective security, and human
21

rights and the rule of law overshadowed the MDGs’ review.
Deletions of key commitments to the MDGs, including a deletion of the timeframe of 2015, were the order of the day.4 On
issues of Official Development Assistance (“ODA”), the developed countries agreed to increase aid by approximately $50 billion a year by 2010.5 This commitment serves to track whether
the developed countries will live up to their initial aid commitment level of 0.7 percent of gross national product (“GNP”). No
mention, however, was made of the need to replace the much
abhorrent Highly Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”) debt sustainability framework.

BACKGROUND

Of particular importance to this article is Goal Eight, a late
addition to the MDGs, which outlines Northern governments’
commitment to a global partnership for development. If Goal
Eight is ignored, it is hard to imagine the poorest countries
achieving any of the other seven Goals. Goal Eight addresses
debt cancellation; trade justice; equitable governance in global
institutions; and political, social, and economic rights for the

“Will the legacy of our generation be more
than a series of broken promises?”

– Nelson Mandela, (2001)3

poor. These issues are an indispensable foundation for policies
that will enable sustained progress to end poverty in the South.
It is an important goal for holding developed countries accountable in advancing the MDGs.6 This goal is particularly significant, as it requires richer countries to reform their policies and
actions to contribute to the fight against poverty.
Developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan
Africa, will not be able to mobilize enough resources to attain
the MDGs by 2015 unless there are radical changes in terms of
aid administration, international trade, and the resolution of the
burgeoning debt crisis.7 One big problem is the conditionality
embedded in each country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(“PRSP”), the center and key to the much needed development
aid.8 The poorest countries are required to prepare PRSPs, under
the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF, in order to qualify for loans or debt relief. The PRSP itself is not an adequate
funding criterion, nor is it an important tool in MDG attainment.
The PRSP depends on a country having a Poverty Reduction
* Charles Mutasa is Executive Director of the African Forum & Network on Debt
& Development (“AFRODAD”).
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and Growth Facility (“PRGF”) program and meeting all the
conditions and benchmarks in the PRGF, which are not contained in the PRSP, but instead are hidden in the “Letter of
Intent” (which lays out the IMF’s recovery plan) between the
government and the IMF.9 Thus, the content of the Letter of
Intent is crucial in attaining the MDGs. Unless the MDG targets
are also included in the IMF and World Bank instruments, the
attainment of MDGs will remain a dream.
It is important to note that the global structures that maintain poverty and marginalize the rights of the poorest clearly
need reform, but the Northern governments' approaches to the
MDGs pay little attention to these major framework issues.The
UN should play a strong role in regular monitoring of the donor
countries’ progress on attaining Goal Eight. Additionally, the
framework for Goal Eight reporting should be revised to include
indicators on global governance and participation.
While a more equitable trade system is vital, donor ODA,
along with substantial debt cancellation, provides the essential,
additional financing capacities. This is particularly true for the
poorest countries’ progress in reducing and eliminating poverty.
Now is the time for the North to honor mutual commitments and
obligations in a spirit of genuine solidarity. Such commitments
are encapsulated in the Millennium Development Goals, in particular Goal Eight.
In this article, of particular interest are Goal Eight targets that:
• Further develop an open trading and financial system
that is rule-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory. This includes a commitment to good governance,
development, and poverty reduction, both nationally
and internationally.
• Address the Least Developed Countries’ (“LDCs”)
special needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free
access for their exports, enhanced debt relief for
heavily indebted poor countries, cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction.
• Deal comprehensively with developing countries’
debt problems through national and international
measures to make debt sustainable in the long term.

Taking Nigeria as an example of an African country embattled with debt, trade, and aid issues, research reveals that four
decades after its independence in 1960, Nigeria remains a poor
country with a per capita income of $260 in 2000.10 At the dawn
of the third millennium, approximately 70 percent of the population still lived on less than a dollar a day – an indicator of extreme
poverty.11 Real gross domestic product (“GDP”) growth has
remained sluggish, averaging 3.5 percent per annum since 2000.
Nigeria is also a highly indebted country with total external debt
exceeding $31 billion in 2003.12 The debt service burden remains
crushing. Foreign aid in the form of ODA has been low and has
declined during the past decade.13 In 2002, ODA per capita was
less than two dollars,14 and total ODA was only 0.4 percent of
GNP. Clearly, Nigeria would find it difficult to attain the
Millennium Development Goals without massive assistance from
development partners in the areas of aid, trade, and debt relief.
FALL 2005

KEY CONCERNS WITH MDG GOAL EIGHT

The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development
(“AFRODAD”) has identified several key concerns with
Northern governments’ commitments to Goal Eight:15
• Donors have not been responsive to LDCs’ programming processes. ODA disbursement is often late, in
most cases coming after the national budget process.
This delays the implementation of poverty-reduction
programs. Donor funding is also inadequate and does
not cover recurrent costs, which comprise the bulk of
government expenditure in the priority sectors. For
example, Tanzania’s debt burden is increasing at an
alarming rate, even though it is on the HIPC
Initiative. There is evidence that, even after the HIPC
relief, debt sustainability levels will not be reached.
• Donor-imposed “Washington Consensus” policies
remain at the heart of PRSPs. Donors increasingly
use PRSPs as a guide to achieving the MDGs under
the largely rhetorical claim that these strategies are
“owned” by developing countries.

• Donor-imposed aid conditions affect the achievability of the MDGs in at least two respects: first, institutions like the IMF and World Bank use aid conditions
to channel aid based on their assessments of compliance to their policy prescriptions. Second, bilateral
donors channel significant MDG aid resources into
highly conditioned budget support for implementing
a country’s PRSP, or into sector-wide programs in
support of a line-ministry program in education,
health, or agriculture.16

• The MDG approach can potentially encourage the
development of a country-owned and credible longterm strategy for growth and poverty reduction. But
the policy-making process falls far short of that
potential. This is partly because implementation of
the MDGs is still driven by the PRGF´s macro-economic framework, and the poverty-reduction strategy
is pegged on the widely disguised HIPC initiative.
Basic policy priorities and operational frameworks
are also lacking and should be pursued under the
MDG framework to break from the poverty trap.
• The government’s role in most African economies has
changed radically after years of implementing World
Bank/IMF structural adjustment programs. From once
being a central player in the economy, the government
has now been pushed to the sidelines where it is supposed to play the role of facilitator and provide only
essential social services. Under the IMF’s Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (“ESAF”) and later
PRGF, the government has embarked on a wide range
of public sector and parastatal reforms.
• Existing macro-economic policies insufficiently
address social issues and poverty-reduction. Policy
reforms have suffered from serious design weakness-
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es in relation to African-type economies because they
neglect the impact of structural constraints, the lack
of economic and social infrastructure, the weakness
of market development and the entrepreneurial class,
and the low private-sector production capabilities. As
a result, the new policy environment does not deliver
high growth rates.

• Genuine ownership of national development policy,
including PRSPs, is a meaningless concept without
effective state capacities to control aid allocation, formulate policy agendas, and monitor outcomes.17 It is
the lack of coordination on the part of donors’ aid
projects in individual countries that undermines the
sustainability of aid programs and negatively affects
resource allocation and growth. Moreover, the
volatility of aid-flows can result in financial instability and hinder stable macroeconomic development.

Aid Issues

Linking donor aid disbursements to donor country goods and
services affects the quality of aid.19 It is estimated that aid-tying
devalues aid for recipients by up to 30 percent.20 Aid-tying continues to be high for a number of donors, despite a recent
Development Assistance Committee (of the Organization for

“There are large areas of the aid system
that are in urgent need of reform.”

– Action Aid International (2005)18

Economic Co-operation and Development) agreement to untie aid
to the LDCs. To illustrate, conditions, such as requiring the privatization of water systems in towns such as Dar es Salaam, were
placed on aid to Tanzania.21 Action like this not only increases
water prices but exposes populations to water-born diseases.22
Donors dictate policies to countries through aid conditionality; failure to meet these conditions can justify delays in aid
disbursement, suspensions of aid, or outright withdrawal. Such
policies have made it difficult for poor countries like Malawi,
Zambia, and Mozambique to use aid for sustainable development, including poverty reduction. Another problem is that
donors’ priorities have not always been consistent with the government’s priorities.
Poor governance, political interference, and corruption
have also affected the effective and efficient use of aid. In
regards to aid to Malawi, the Danish Charge D'Affaires, Finn
Skadkaer Pedersen, said that “a weak administration” and “systematic intimidation of the opposition” in Malawi have interfered with development programs since 1995.23 In return,
Malawi’s former President Bakili Muluzi accused donors of
meddling in African politics “by using their aid money to influence political trends on the continent.”24 Relations between
Denmark and Malawi worsened late last year when an audit
report instituted by Danish ambassador Orla Bakdal revealed
anomalies in Malawi’s use of Danish aid.25
23

Debt Issues

Debt continues to inhibit growth and wealth redistribution
by reducing the amount of money available to governments for
investment in social services and welfare. Debt service has
resulted in a decline in the rate of economic growth that, in turn,
has been associated with a decline in per capita income.

“Debt is tearing down schools and
hospitals. The effects are no less
devastating than war.”

– Adabayo Adedeji, African Center for
Development Strategy26

According to data reported in the World Development Reports,
Malawi’s GNP per capita appears to have risen during the 1970s
and peaked at $210 in 1983. It thereafter decreased, reaching
$160 in 1987. It then rose again, reaching the previous peak of
$210 in 1992, ultimately rising to $220 in 1997. Since then, per
capita GNP has fallen continuously and now stands at approximately $195. The decline in the rate of economic growth has
been associated with a decline in education services that make it
difficult to attain the MDGs.27 The increase in primary and secondary school enrollments has not been matched with a commensurate expansion in resources. As a result, classroom
accommodation is inadequate, with many primary school pupils
having to learn in outdoor settings. Boarding accommodation in
secondary schools is also insufficient.28
Healthcare has experienced a similar fate. The increase in
budgetary allocation to the health sector has been inadequate to
meet the needs of a rapidly increasing number of patients. This
has resulted in increasing numbers of in-patients per government hospital bed, declining availability of drugs and other
materials, and inadequate numbers of doctors in relation to the
size of the population. The delivery of medical services in government hospitals and clinics has certainly become inefficient.
Instead, government resources must go to debt repayment. The
world’s poorest countries continue to pay more every year in
debt payments than they receive in grants and loans, repaying an
enormous £ 100 million every day to the rich North.29
Sustainable debt-financing on the part of the developing
countries is an important element for mobilizing resources for
public and private investment. Exclusion of domestic debt and
contingent liabilities in the debt sustainability analysis are a particular concern for the HIPCs because of their implications for
fiscal resources available for financing poverty reduction.30
The 2005 Gleneagles’ G-8 Debt Deal is a step forward and
sets an important precedent in terms of granting a full cancellation of debt to all severely indebted poor countries.31 However,
the deal only represents one-eighth of what Africa needs in
terms of debt cancellation, because the deal only cancels $40
billion out of Africa’s burgeoning debt stock of over $330 billion. The $40 billion debt forgiveness “represents less than ten
percent of debt cancellation required for poor nations to meet
the MDGs in 2015.”32 The plan is additionally insufficient in
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that it leaves out heavily indebted and impoverished middleincome countries. Furthermore, the eighteen qualifying countries are less than a third of countries that would need full cancellation in order to meet the MDGs by 2015.33 A prior press
release issued by AFRODAD explained this problem:
The G-8 debt agreement does not address the real global power imbalances but rather reinforces global
apartheid. The question of creditor-debtor co-responsibility of the South’s debt remains unresolved, as issues
of odious and illegitimate debts continue to be swept
under the carpet. It is not a lasting solution in which all
stakeholders-debtors and creditors have a say. It is just
a piecemeal measure that seems to deal with the symptoms of the problems and not the causes.34

Trade Issues

Africa’s share of global wealth over the last two decades
has decreased tremendously on a number of fronts, even in an
era of reforms. World trade, world production, net financial
flows, and foreign direct investments have been hindered either
by poor governance, the heavy debt burden, or by conflict and
political instability.
Increased foreign direct investment is unlikely to help subSaharan Africa attain the MDGs, particularly, because attracting
a constant stream of foreign direct investment is improbable.
The strongest critics of foreign direct investment call foreign
investors “whimsical,” “Afro-pessimistic,” and “unreliable partners.”35 South African president, Thabo Mbeki, made the following comments:
In our own country, we have been assured that our economic fundamentals are correct and sound. We have
developed a stable and effective financial and fiscal
system. We have reduced tariffs to levels that are comparable to the advanced industrial countries. We have
reformed agriculture to make it the least subsidized of
all the major agricultural trading nations. We have
restructured our public sector through privatization,
strategic partners and regulation . . . Yet, the flow of
investment into South Africa has not met our expectations while the levels of poverty and unemployment
remain high.36

Market access opportunities for LDCs can only be effective
if LDCs are assisted in building their capacities to produce tradable goods of higher value and acceptable quality at competitive
costs. Using the foreign exchange earned from primary exports,
these countries must survive on exports of raw cashew nuts, coffee, tea, and cotton, while importing everything else in the form
of industrial goods from abroad.37
LDCs’ chances to attain the MDGs are also harmed by the
subsidies for agricultural products in developed countries,
which pose an impossible challenge to most developing countries’ efforts to export farm produce to European markets. Yet, it
is in this area where LDCs have a comparative advantage that
would enable them to attain MDGs if given an opportunity for
fair competition.38
FALL 2005

Under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act
(“AGOA”), Africa has increased exports of goods and products
to the U.S. market, especially textiles and clothing, nuts, beans,
and tobacco.39 However, Africa faces a number of constraints in
exporting to the U.S. market that will affect its ability to attain
the MDGs. The problems include supply-side constraints, high
administrative demands by the U.S. government, the high cost
of credit, lack of diversification, and competition from low-cost
producers of textiles and clothing (subsequent to the WTO’s
decision not to subject Chinese exports to quotas.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

To Donors and Developed Countries

The global community needs to realize that placing exclusive emphasis on MDG targets, while delivering only development aid without more sweeping reforms, will serve to shift the
blame once again onto the impoverished countries and their
people when the MDG targets are not met. Rather, donor countries should instead refocus their actions and policies by using a
more inclusive assessment of what it will take to achieve a sustained development away from poverty.40
AFRODAD suggests several goals that donors and developed countries should prioritize:41
• In order to be effective, aid should make a positive
impact on income levels and on poverty reduction.
• ODA should be more predictable to allow for better
planning. To date, the domestic resource base has
proved more reliable and more predictable than external resources.

• Better coordination and harmonization of donor
countries’ activities and the channelling of more
resources through the budget process will ensure that
money is used for programs identified as national priorities.

• Aid should be untied and donor countries should provide technical assistance for capacity building. Some
donors have completely untied aid while others are
still constrained by their national policies and laws.

To LDCs

Similarly, AFRODAD recommends that LDCs focus on the
following principles:
• Maintain support to the priority sectors by increasing
their budgetary allocations.
• Commit to increasing domestic resource mobilization, upholding the principles of rule of law and good
governance, intensifying the fight against corruption,
and putting in place an environment conducive to
improving the effectiveness of aid and attracting
investments.42

• Link trade policy with other government policy documents on poverty reduction and economic growth.
Specifically, LDCs need to adopt appropriate measures to safeguard domestic industry and protect
investors who are threatened by market liberalization.
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To reduce reliance on imports for basic commodities,
economic activities need to be protected in order to
serve household demands.

• Improve the quality and quantity of exports.
Capacity-building of domestic investors is needed to
facilitate better product quality and quantity. Foreign
direct investment should be encouraged in areas
requiring high capital outlay, rather than in low capital sectors that are more appropriate for local
investors.

• Retain the right to control investments and exchange
rate regimes so that foreign direct investments and
transnational corporations serve the needs of people
by contributing to locally and nationally determined
sustainable human development strategies. Financial
liberalization and deregulation have left capital flows
elusive to many governments and citizens in the
South.
• Take steps to domesticate technical assistance. Much
of the debt and ODA goes to technical assistance, but
that technical assistance merely funds expatriate consultants and contributed little to domestic capacity.

To Civil Society

While NGOs in the past have concentrated on service delivery, many more are now engaged in social mobilization and
advocacy, as well as serving as a bridge between local communities and government. Most donors have begun to regard NGOs
as an effective way of reaching the poor and a mechanism for
channeling a sizeable percentage of donor funds. AFRODAD
recommends that:
• Social activists must pressure the government to undertake an audit (review) of each of the projects/programs
for which the loans were incurred. Two reasons warrant
such an audit. First, audits would enable the government to truly verify the genuineness of the debts that
LDCs are servicing. Second, the responsible officers
who contracted the odious loans and/or those who
expended them should be prosecuted. Encouraging this
action would help social activists signal to the government the seriousness of accountability, as well as cure
the country’s battered image.

• Take an important and decisive participatory role in
the international regulatory and decision-making
processes. Locally, governments and transnational
corporations must be accountable to their citizens
through civil society organizations and locally-elected officials. Top-bottom decision making should give
way to a human rights-based approach to development where people are the masters of their own destiny able to make informed choices and decisions
about their own development. It is important to
remember that people are not developed but that they
develop themselves.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of MDGs will require substantial, new,
and additional resources from both domestic and external
sources. Strong commitments are required from developed
countries, LDCs, and civil society.
The key issue in trade development is the need to address
supply side constraints. The market access opportunities for
LDCs can only be effective if LDCs are assisted in building their
capacities to produce tradable goods of higher value and acceptable quality at competitive cost. The MDGs will be difficult to
attain for a debt-sustaining African country surviving on exports
of raw cashew nuts, coffee, tea, and cotton, while importing
everything else in the form of industrial goods from abroad.
For many African governments, close collaboration
among the different stakeholders is necessary to meet the
MDGs. Key actors include the government, civil society
organizations, the private sector, and the donors. At the
moment, a framework for collaboration among the various
players does not exist, and clarity of roles is lacking.
Therefore, a need to develop a collaboration framework will
be especially crucial for resource sharing and reviewing
progress. MDGs should be explicitly situated within a framework of existing human right treaties, such as the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and state
rights, such as the right to development. This focus on rights
stresses the obligations of all states, including Northern governments, to prioritize their responsibility to take specific steps
toward progress on social and economic rights for all.
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